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Richard T. Ackley 
The signing of the treaty on "Limita-
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems" 
and the "Interim Agreement of Certain 
Measures with Respect to the Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms" were 
proclaimed as historic events in every 
sense of the word. A White House 
statement referring to the 26 May 1972 
Nixon-Brezhnev summit accords hailed 
the signing as "the first time that two 
major powers have achieved this kind of 
understanding affecting their vital se-
curity." The real significance of the two 
agreements, however, is the claim that 
they "enhanced the security of both 
sides."! If, in fact, one is to deal 
critically with the latter statement, the 
strategic national security objectives of 
both the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
should be tested against the terms of the 
agreements, then against the strategic 
balance as it has developed today. 
In the broadest of terms, any effec-
tive strategic arms control measures 
must reduce the likelihood of nuclear 
war, as well as reduce one's own damage 
if war should occur. The point is, arms 
control must contribute to national 
security defense policy or it does not 
make sense at all. That is, it must 
enhance nuclear deterrence, provide 
damage-limitation, and enhance crisis 
stability-preclude a "first-strike 
bonus." More specifically, the U.S. stra-
tegic policy has been widely publicized 
and clearly stated over recent years. 
President Nixon has said, "deterrence of 
war is the primary goal of our strategic 
policy and the principal function of our 
nuclear forces.,,2 Thus, our strategic 
objectives continue to be: 
• to deter all-out attack on the 
United States or its allies; 
• to face any potential aggressor 
contemplating less than all-out attack 
with unacceptable risks; and 
• to maintain a stable political en-
vironment within which the threat of 
aggression or coercion against the 
United States or its allies is minimized. 3 
U.S. strategic objectives, then, en-
compass deterrence, assured destruc-
tion, and crisis stability; they are basi-
cally defensive, slight damage-limitation, 
and reject a first-strike option. On the 
other hand, the strategic objectives of 
the U.S.~.R. are not presented nearly so 
neatly to us by the Soviet leadership;. 
however, throughout the years there has 
been a consistency in statements and 
remarks by senior Soviet military offi-
cers and party leaders that provide a 
base from which a set of strategic 
objectives may be derived. 
As early as 1962, Soviet Marshal 
V.D. Sokolovskii, in the first edition of 
his book Military Strategy, revealed that 
"the basic method of waging the war 
will be by massive missile blows to 
destroy the aggressor's instruments for 
nuclear attack and ... to attain victory 
within the shortest possible time.,,4 In 
the same year, Marshal Malinovskii, 
writing in Kommunist, seemed to imply 
the possibility of frustrating "the op-
ponent's aggressive intentions" without 
initiating war. In other words, Mali-
novskii sought to deter an attack by 
maintaining such a strong military force 
that the question of an opponent's 
victory would be unsure. Additionally, 
Malinovskii revealed a war-winning 
strategy when he wrote, "if war should 
become a fact," we will decisively "de-
stroy the aggressor."s And in 1969 
Marshal N.1. Krylov, Chief of the Stra-
tegic Missile Forces, reiterated a war-
fighting, war-winning strategy. He 
noted, 
the imperialist ideologists are try-
ing to lull the vigilance of the 
world's peoples by having re-
course to propaganda devices to 
the effect that there will be no 
victors in a future nuclear war . 
. . . Victory in war, if the im-
perialists succeed in starting it, 
will be on the side of world 
socialism and all progressive man-
kind. 6 
Three years later, in 1972, an article 
in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil 
emphasized that 
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In the current phase, the Armed 
Forces should be capable of 
stopping a surprise attack by the 
aggressor in any situation and use 
rapid, crushing blows to destroy 
his main nuclear missile weapons 
and troop formations, thus se-
curing favorable conditions for 
further conduct of and victorious 
conclusion to the war. 7 
Soviet military doctrine, then, asserts 
that should the Soviet Union be threat-
ened with war, it would initiate a 
preemptive attack which would seek to 
destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons 
forces before they are launched against 
the U_S.S.R. 8 
As a distinction to the defensive U.S. 
strategic objectives of deterrence, as-
sured destruction, and crisis stability, 
the U.S.S.R. has a fundamental uncer-
tainty as to who will initiate a first 
strike but, nevertheless, looks forward 
to victory if nuclear war should occur. 
From an assessment of Soviet literature, 
three strategic objectives are apparent: 
• to deter an attack by being able to 
retaliate under any circumstances. 
• to frustrate (preempt) any surprise 
attack by an enemy; and 
• to win any nuclear war that may 
occur. 
In summary, the Sov,iet objectives 
might be stated simply as nuclear deter-
rence, a counterforce damage-limiting 
capability, and an overall war-winning 
strategy. 
Arms Agreements and the Strategic 
Balance. In brief, the terms of the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limit 
each party to 100 ABM's at each of two 
sites, one protecting the national capital 
and the other protecting part of the 
nation's offensive strategic forces. When 
the treaty was signed, the U.S.S.R. had 
an operational ABM system defending 
the Moscow area that consisted of some 
64 launchers with supporting radars and 
command and control equipment. On 
the other hand, the United States had 
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planned to deploy some 200 ABM's to 
protect its Minuteman intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) sites. 
Up to the present time, the U.S.S.R. 
has continued to develop an advanced 
ABM missile to replace the Galosh in 
the Moscow complex and appears to be 
increasing the number of its launchers 
from 64 to 100. In contrast, the United 
States has no operational ABM's and 
has, in essence, given up the Safeguard 
program, other than one site for defense 
of the ICBM field at Grand Forks-
which is to become operational in late 
1974. There is no indication of Ameri-
can intent to build the allowed ABM 
site for defense of the Nation's capital 
in the near future. 
The executive agreement for de-
ployment of strategic offensive missiles 
places numerical ceilings on the de-
ployment of ICBM's and submarine 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's). 
The numerical ceilings were supposed to 
equal actual missile deployments, plus 
the number of missiles being built for 
deployment at the time the treaty was 
signed. Additionally, there are allowable 
variations to account for substitutions 
of certain new weapons for older ones. 
In sum and substance, however, the U.S. 
ceilings equaled actual deployments, a 
figure that has remained unaltered since 
1967. On the other hand, the ceiling for 
the U.S.S.R. was substantially higher 
than the strategic missiles actually de-
ployed on 26 May 1972 and, further-
more, for the long term the Soviets were 
permitted near half again more missiles 
than the United States. That is, the 
U.S.S.R. is permitted 2,359 missiles to 
1,710 for the United States, or a nu-
merical advantage of 649. (See figures 1 
and 2.) Particularly bothersome is the 
fact that the Soviet ceilings were U.S. 
derived figures-agreed to by the 
U.S.S.R.-and in no way represent a 
Russian statement of the actual number 
of strategic weapons they have in place 
or under construction. 
While the interim agreement set 
quantitative limits on ICBM's and 
SLBM's, no ·prohibitions were placed on 
qualitative improvements. That is, tech-
nological advances to missiles and mis-
sile systems are permitted-such as mul-
tiple independently targeted reentry 
vehicles (MIRV's), improved missile 
accuracy, et cetera. It is in this latter 
category, as well as certain forces not 
included in the agreements, that the 
United States justifies the numerical 
missile superiority granted the Soviets. 
That is, the MIRV program gives the 
United States a 2 to 1 lead in numbers 
of warheads, and this lead is projected 
throughout the 5-year agreement. 
Nevertheless, because of the size of 
Soviet weapons, the U.S.S.R. can place 
about four times more "megatonnage 
on target" than can the United States. 
In terms of strategic forces not 
covered in the agreements, the adminis-
tration has noted that "to assess the 
overall balance it is also necessary to 
consider those forces not in the agree-
ment; our bomber force, for instance, is 
substantially larger and more effective 
than· the Soviet bomber force."g Two 
points are pertinent here. First, is that 
"bomber force" refers only to heavy 
bombers (maximum range of over 6,000 
miles). In this category it is true the 
United States holds numerical advantage 
(457 to 140) over the Soviets. When 
heavy bombers are combined with other 
delivery vehicles, the gap then is 
narrowed to 332 in favor of the 
U.S.S.R., versus the 649 Russian edge 
that occurs without taking bombers into 
consideration. 1 0 What seems to be 
neglected in this reasoning is a com-
parison of United States and Soviet air 
defense forces. While the United States 
has some 600 interceptors and 500 
surface-to-air (SAM) launchers, the 
U.S.S.R. has near 3,000 interceptors 
and 10,000 SAM launchers. "The Soviet 
Union's commanding lead over the 
United States in numbers of air defense 
radar sites, command and control facili-
ties, surface-to-air missile launchers, and 
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United States Soviet Union 
Titan II 5-10 Mtea. 54 SS-7/8 5 Mt ea. 209 
Minuteman I 1 Mt ea. 260 SS-9 (+ new silos) 25 Mt ea. 313 
Minuteman II 1-2 Mt ea. 510 SS-11/13 (+ new silos) 1-2 Mt ea. 1,096 
Minuteman III 3 x 200 kt ea. 230 
Total ICBM's 1,054 Total ICBM's 1,618 
Polaris A-2 800 kt ea. 128 SLBM's on modern SSBN's Mt range 710 
Polaris A-3 3 x 200 ktea. 208 SLBM's on older SSBN's Mt range 30 
Poseidon 10 x 50 ktea. 320 
Total SLBM's 656 Total SLBM's 740 
Total Launchers 1,710 Total Launchers 2,358 
·Operational and Under Construction or Conversion. 
Sources: Commanders Digest, Nov. 15, 1973. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1973-1974 
(London: 1973). 
Fig. 1-United States & U.S.S.R. Strategic Offensive Missile Launchers 
Associated with Interim SAL Agreement* 
Interim SAL 
1967 1969 1973 Ceilings 
U.S. U.S.S.R. U.S. U.S.S.R. U.S_ U.S.S.R. U.S. U.S.S.R. 
ICBM's 1,054 460 1,004 1,050 1,054 1,527 1,000 1,409 
SLBM's 656 130 656 160 656 628 710 740 
Total 1,710 590 1,710 1,210 1,710 2,155 1,710 2,358 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1973-1974 
(London: 1973). 
Fig. 2-Historical Changes in United States/U.S.S.R. Strategic Force Levels 
interceptor aircraft is expected to con-
tinue over the next five years." 1 1 
The other point is dismissing gra-
tuitously medium-range bombers (maxi-
mum range of 3,500-6,000 miles). With 
maximum range reduced to combat 
range because of fuel, weapons load, 
and flying at optimum penetration al~­
tude, medium bombers can still conduct 
a one-way intercontinental mission-a 
factor that does not seem unreasonable 
in an "all-out" nuclear war. When con-
sidering medium bombers, we find the 
U.S.S.R. has about 800, and the United 
States 74.12 
Although often glossed-over in treat-
ments of the SAL agreement, it should 
be pointed out that SLBM's in Soviet 
diesel submarines and Soviet submarine 
launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) in 
both nuclear and diesel submarines are 
not within the framework of the agree-
ment_ There are about 66 Soviet 
SLBM's in the 350-750-mile range with 
warheads of megaton yields that are not 
considered, as well as some 338 SLCM's 
in the 450-mile range with warheads of 
kiloton yields. 1 3 (The United States 
does not possess either of these weapons 
systems.) Most certainly, these weapons 
can create nuclear devastation if em-
ployed against strategic coastal targets. 
Although the United States relies on 
maintaining a qualitative superiority in 
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strategic weapons, recent developments 
indicate the U.S.S.R. is challenging the 
American lead. For example, in August 
1973 Secretary of Defense James R. 
Schlesinger disclosed that the Soviets 
successfully demonstrated flight tests of 
the MIRV capability on at least two of 
their missiles. The SS-17 (comparable to 
Minuteman) and the SS-18 (the possible 
successor to the huge 25 Mt SS-9) were 
tested, each with four and six MIRV's, 
respectively. In this context one might 
note that each SS-18 warhead is on the 
order of one megaton; while the biggest 
U.S. MIRV is mounted on the Minute-
man III, which carries three warheads of 
about 20 kt each. Soviet MIRV develop-
ment is certainly significant, yet there 
are at least three new Soviet ICBM's in 
advanced development and testing that 
are probably follow-ons for the older 
S8-9, SS-ll, and SS-13. In addition, the 
Soviets have a 4,000-mile SLBM for 
their new Delta-class ballistic missile 
nuclear powered submarine. A com-
parable U.S. missile for the Trident 
submarine is years away. 
The crux of the matter is that MIRV 
is not in the SAL agreement, so the 
U.S.S.R. can overcome the U.S. advan-
tage in technology; however, the United 
States is constrained to present strategic 
force levels and cannot overcome the 
Soviet numerical advantage. 
There are, however, many weapons 
and weapon systems not included in 
SALT, and certainly some of them have 
no place in the accords. For instance, 
what the Soviets call American "for-
ward based systems" (FBS)-meaning 
European based U.S. tactical missiles, 
fighter-bombers, and carrier-based strike 
aircraft-seem best dealt with as 
"theater forces" along with Soviet inter-
mediate and medium-range ballistic 
missiles (I/MRBM's), and light bombers 
in the current mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) talks involving 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Also, 
British and French strategic forces do 
not "fit" in the agreement but might be 
handled on a bilateral basis-as the 
Soviets likely would want the United 
States to deal with the strategic forces 
of China (P.R.C.). 
In weighing the national security 
objectives of the United States and 
U.S.S.R. against the terms of the SAL 
agreements and the strategic balance 
today, the contention that the accords 
"enhance the security of both sides" is 
open to question. The stated strategic 
objectives of the United States include 
nuclear deterrence, assured destruction, 
and crisis stability. Those of the 
U.S.S.R. include nuclear deterrence, a 
counterforce damage-limiting ability, 
and a war-winning goal. So, in light of 
the continuing Soviet strategic buildup, 
one might examine official American 
strategic evaluations, before and after 
the 26 May 1972 agreements, for pos-
sible insights. 
In his 25 February 1971 foreign 
policy statement, President Nixon 
stated in part that the number of Soviet 
strategic forces now exceeds the level 
needed for deterrence.14 At that time 
he also observed that Soviet offensive 
systems have clearly developed to a 
point where certain further improve-
ments, as well as increased launcher 
deployments, could pose a threat to 
U.S. land-based missile retaliatory forces 
and thus threaten stability. 15 And 
finally, the President mentioned the 
strategic balance would be endangered if 
we limited defensive forces alone and 
left the offensive threat to our strategic 
forces unconstrained. 1 6 
Despite the President's admonitions 
in 1971, the agreements signed in 1972 
self-imposed numerical limits on U.S. 
strategic forces below those given the 
Soviets, while allowing both sides a free 
hand in making qualitative improve-
ments to their forces. 
The U.S.S.R. continues, near un-
abated, in improving its strategic posi-
tion. Over 68 new SLBM launchers have 
been added to the Soviet inventory 
since mid-1972. Additionally, at least 
three new Soviet ICBM's have been 
noted, as well as MIRV testing and a 
new long-range SLBM_ In strategic de-
fensive forces, the United States has 
given up a major Safeguard system for a 
single missile site defense that will not 
be,. operational until late 1974. On the 
other hand, the U.S.S.R. has an ABM 
complex operational in the Moscow area 
and is making qualitative and quantita-
tive improvements to this system. 
If, in fact, the 1971 Soviet strategic 
posture was threatening, as indicated by 
the President, then subsequent develop-
ments makes one more uneasy over an 
"enhanced U.S. security." To be sure, in 
1973 the President, in commenting on 
the above-mentioned Soviet strategic 
force improvements, said, 
If present trends continue and we 
do not take remedial steps, the 
forces which we currently rely 
upon to survive an attack and to 
retaliate could be more vulner-
able. At some time in the future 
we could face a situation in which 
during a crisis there could be a 
premium to the side that initiated 
nuclear war. This would be an 
unstable and dangerous strategic 
relationship. Such a strategic en-
vironment is unacceptable. 1 7 
Since it appears that there is reason 
to question the contention that the 26 
May 1972 arms agreements did, in fact, 
enhance the security of both sides, one 
might ask, What is left of SALT? The 
increase in Russian nuclear capability 
since 1972 can hardly increase the 
reliability of American nuclear deter-
rence or its assured destruction capa-
bility, despite the qualitative improve-
ments made to some existing U.S. mis-
siles. Additionally, the development of 
MIRV by the U.S.S.R. along with their 
megaton yield warheads, would seem to 
negate rather than to enhance the U.S. 
objective of crisis stability, while at the 
same time improving Soviet damage-
limitation. 
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In stark contrast, Soviet deterrence 
appears enhanced by the same measure 
that U.S. deterrence is degraded. MIRV 
and three new ICBM systems tend to 
bolster a Russian counterforce damage-
limiting capability and correspondingly 
contribute to ~heir war-~ning 
strategy. There seems little doubt the 
U.S.S.R. considers both quantitative 
superiority and qualitative com-
petence important to its strategic ob-
jectives. 
While the United States can take 
remedial steps in such fields as "hard-
target" warheads for a "limited counter-
force" capability, SLCM's, mobile 
ICBM's, et cetera, it remains difficult to 
see how the 26 May 1972 agreements 
enhanced the security of the United 
States. The argument that the interim 
agreement slowed down the Soviet force 
buildup cannot be established as no one 
really knows Soviet intentions. After all, 
if the United States continued to deploy 
strategic missiles at the rate it did 
between mid-1963 and mid-1964, today 
it would have over 100,000 missiles 
deployed! In total, it appears that the 
United States is worse off, the Soviet 
Union is better off, and deterrence may 
be even more questionable today than it 
was in May 1972. 
With the above situation as a back-
drop, one would hesitate to predict 
great success for SALT-II. The 1972 
5-year agreements could just expire, for 
the United States has numerical missile 
inferiority and no monopoly on tech-
nology, research, development, or 
modernization. If deterrence, damage-
limitation, and crisis stability are really 
important, then support for strategic 
nuclear parity, as advocated by the 
Jackson amendment to the ABM 
Treaty of 14 September 1972, indeed 
makes sense. Parity, after all, does not 
preclude a mutual reduction in num-
bers, and technology might then be a 
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